Abstract-Small and inexpensive computing devices are becoming potential players in the Internet arena as they are used for collecting or generating information and later relay them to the designated servers. The information gathered must be adequately protected against all kinds of attacks during storage and communication. However, smart constrained devices have limited resources and unable to run most of the classical protocols that provide robust security.
I. Introduction
Smart constrained computing devices are slowly becoming major players in the Internet arena dominated by the era of ubiquitous computing. There is a steady emergence of platforms [4] , [15] that allow smart constrained computing devices to independently interconnect and interact with other parties over the Internet in ways that were not initially envisaged.
Before harnessing the full potential brought by these technologies into our daily lives we must first address core security and privacy issues pertaining to the information stored and exchanged. Most classical security protocol are too demanding for resource constrained devices [2] , [21] .
The era of ubiquitous computing places constrained devices in remote geographic locations which may hinder them from effectively communicating with the central server. Any service requiring persistent connection to the central server may be very unrealiable due to the intermittent connectivity. Hence, there is a need for alternative secure solutions that allow constrained smart devices to offer services regardless of the state of the central server.
This paper proposes a serverless mutual authentication protocol for mobile resource-constrained devices. Our protocol is symmetric, lightweight and uses simple primitives like keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), XoR and comparison operations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows, section II presents a scenario pertaining to the protocol discussed in this article while section III presents related work. Section IV discusses our proposed protocol and section V validates our protocol using AVISPA tool. Protocol's analysis is done in section VI and section VII concludes.
II. Serverless Protocol Scenario and Features
Imagine a scenario where tracking devices are attached to containers in transit from one geographic location to another. Tracking devices collect and log crucial information in the course of the trip but also serve as identifiers for the respective containers they are attached to. On transiting borders or checkpoints, controllers possessing mobile personal digital assistants (PDAs) must authenticate to tracking devices before accessing stored information, for instance container number, type of merchandise, destination e.t.c. But, PDAs must obtain prior authorization to access information in tracking devices from a remote central server, which is only accessible via the network.
One way to accomplish this task requires PDAs to establish persistent connections to the central server during the authentication process. However, in case of network unavailability, the PDAs cannot communicate with tracking devices. The journey must be delayed until connection is established, which leads to unnecessary inconveniences.
Alternatively, PDAs may periodically connect to the central server, whenever the network is available, to download appropriate authentication data and store them locally. In doing so, PDAs can autonomously authenticate tracking devices without the need of a persistent connection to the central server. This guarantees reliable authentication between legitimate PDAs and tracking devices, even when the central server is unavailable or incapacitated.
Our proposed scenario contains three types of communicating parties -Central Server (CS), Lightweight Responder (LR) 
III. Related Work
Various security protocols for constrained devices have been put forward. In 2008, Tan et al. [25] proposed Serverless search and authentication RFID protocol, which allows an RFID reader to authenticate RFID tags without the need for persistent connection to the backend server. However, Tan et al.'s protocol was found to suffer from traceability, impersonation and privacy attacks [24] .
In 2009, Lin et al. [17] proposed a serverless RFID authentication protocol, which improved the computational performance of Tan et al. protocol. However, Lin et al.'s, like with Tan et al.'s, protocol allowed only the reader to authenticates the tag but the tag does not authenticate the reader [16] . Moreover, Lin et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to impersonation attack [16] .
Hoque et al. [12] proposed a serverless, untraceable authentication, and forward secure protocol for RFID tags to safeguard both reader and tags against common attacks without the need of backend server's intervention. But, Deng et al. [8] found that Hoque et al.'s protocol was susceptible to data desynchronization attack and improved it to withstand data desynchronization attacks. However, Deng et al.'s protocol is still vulnerable to data desynchronization attack after two protocol runs [23] .
The authors of [1] proposed ERAP, the ECC based RFID Authentication Protocol, which performs mutual authentication between the reader and the authorized RFID tags without the need of persistent connection to the backend server. This scheme was found vulnerable to denial of service attack by authors of [19] . The authors of [26] propose (HOA) HLR Offline Authentication, the authentication scheme suitable for low-power mobile devices based on ECC. However this protocol requires prior knowledge of each communicating entity and too much CPU and memory resources as tags must perform ECC point multiplication and modular operations.
IV. Serverless Mutual Authentication
Protocol Our protocol leverages on the power of CS's knowledge on LR clusters with their respective credentials to facilitate authentication, even though CS does not actively participate during the mutual authentication phase.
A. Security and Privacy Requirements
Our protocol must fulfill the following requirements. 1. Mutual Authentication: Our protocol must perform mutual authentication between LR and LI prior to data exchange session in order to thwart impersonation attacks.
Key Exchange:
Our protocol must securely establish a common key between LR and LI to be used during data exchange session.
Freshness:
Messages exchanged during mutual authentication session must be fresh. Our protocol uses timestamp and random values to enforce freshness.
B. Privacy and Security threat models
We propose privacy and security games to model possible threats and demonstrate how relisient our protocol can be against attacks. 
E. Protocol Description
Our protocol operates in two phases: 1) Phase A -Interaction Between CS and LI: LI requests authorization from CS to access information stored in LRs. CS also uses this phase to synchronize time with LI. LI securely connects to CS and sends message a 1 for requesting authorization to access a cluster of LRs in its vicinity. Message a 1 contains LR's identifier ID L and its geographic location. CS receives LI's request and generates a list L j of temporary identities for each LR within a cluster (cf. Line (4)), LI's key K L (cf. Line (5)) and secret code H K (cf. Line (6)). CS sends back message a 2 via the established secure channel (cf. Line (7)). LI receives and decrypts message a 2 containing K L , H K , AR, W S and L j .
:
LI a 2
←− CS : KL, HK , WS , AR, Lj

LI : Get KL, HK , WS , AR, Lj
Listing 1: Authorization phase between CS and LI 2) Phase B -Mutual Authentication Between LR and LI: Mutual authentication between LI and LR is completed in three exchanges without assistance from CS.
To solicit LR's in a cluster, LI encrypts its identifier ID L using its secret code H K (cf. Line (10)) and then calculates timestamp signature H T (cf. Line (11) (16)), then use it to recover ID L (cf. Line (17)) which is used to calculate K L (cf. Line (18)). Using K L , LR authenticates timestamp signature H T (cf. Line (20)). A valid H T validates K L and prompts LR to update its timestamp (cf. Line (21)).
With a valid K L , LR generates a temporary identity using its identifier Id and T 0 (cf. Line (24)), generates a signature H 1 for T LI (cf. Line (25)) and a random R 1 (cf. Line (26)), which is used to calculate a cipher e 1 and a signature H 2 (cf. Lines (27) and (28) (40)). B4. Generation of session key K S : After successful authentication, LI and LR generate session key K S in lines (37) and (41) respectively. A shared session key K S allows LR and LI to securely exchange data, for instance using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
LI
: Get current timestamp TLI
LR : if TZ < TC or TZ < TLI or TLI < TC or T0 < TLI (14)
END SESSION (15) :
END SESSION
: Generate random R1
: e1 = R1 ⊕ IdT emp (27) :
: else %% AR is authentic (35)
: [9] i.e an attacker has full capabilities over the newtork and can listen or intercept communication, inject new messages or modify messages in transit.
In Table II 
VI. Protocol Analysis A. LR's Performance Analysis
In our scenario, LR is the most resource constrained device but holds all the sensitive information, hence we analyze its performance in the following areas: Computational Cost: Our proposed protocol uses simple primitives such as comparison, XoR and HMAC. HMAC is more resource demanding than a normal Hash function or the rest of the primitives used in our protocol but guarantees optimal security by reducing the number of collisions compared to a normal Hash function [14] . Storage Cost: Our protocol stores few parameters, K C , Id and T C amounting to 288 bits (36 bytes) in LR. During runtime, our protocol requires a total of 736 bits (92 bytes) of storage in LR (corresponds to Line (18) of Listing 2). Communication Cost: Constrained devices expend a lot of energy in transmitting and receiving information [18] , [20] , hence fewer and shorter messages reduce energy consumption. Our protocol exchanges three messages during mutual authentication stage with a total of 992 bits (124 bytes).
B. Security and Privacy Analysis
We analyse our protocol against threat models put forth in Section IV-B. This analysis complements AVISPA's validation in Section V by examining the mechanisms of the exchanged information in details. Game 1 : β masquerades as LI ; Referring to Game 1 in Section IV-B, β's objective is to send valid messages b 1 and b 3 . That is, β can either try to crack the key K L along with ID L or generate a valid message b 3 based on previously sniffed messages b 2 and b 3 during Phase 1.1.
After cracking key K L along with ID L , β is able to spoof LI. One of the solutions involves extracting values H T and T LI from a known message b 1 and try to crack K L . This assumes that the HMAC function is not robust to collision attacks, which is contrary to our assumption of Section IV-C. Alternatively, β can combine messages b 1 , b 2 and b 3 and try to deduce valuable information. However, all messages behave like random or pseudo-random strings. Indeed, e 1 is randomized thanks to R 1 . Values e ID , H T , H 2 and b 3 are HMAC outputs and, as stated in [11] , they behave as pseudo-random strings and evolve independently from each other as their inputs are different. As such, whatever the number of sniffed messages b 1 , b 2 and b 3 , β can neither extract useful information nor win the game. Game 2: β tracks LR; Following Game 2 in Section IV-B, LR i responds for session j with messages e 1ij and e 2ij which behave as random or pseudo-random strings. Such that, any response from LR 1 is semantically indistinguishable from responses of LR 2 , and previous responses of LR 1 . Hence, an adversary β is unable to guess with a probability greater than 0.5 which LR i sent message b2. Game 3: β depletes LR's resources; Game 3 in Section IV-B is a form of Denial of Service (DoS) attack such that an adversary β constantly queries LR to utilize its resources and deplete its energy source. Our protocol tests message b 1 using four comparison operations, four HMAC operations, and one XoR operation to verify validity. But HMAC consumes more energy as explained in section VI-A. Now, let us quantify the duration of time needed for β to deplete an alkaine long-life AAA battery with total energy of 5071 Joules [13] . If LR conforms to IEEE 802.15.4 [5] with an antenna frequency of 2.4 GHz band, data rate of 250 Kbps, and power consumption of 1.475W in receive mode [6] , then it will take approximately 2 ms (milliseconds) to receive 480 bits of data sent in message b 1 by dissipating 1.475*0.002 = 0.003 Joules. According to [22] , HMAC function consumes 1.16μJ (microjoules) per byte of data. Parameters used in calculations have a total of 960 bits or 120 bytes for H K (Line (16)), and ID L (Line (17)), K L (Line (18)), and H T (Line (19) ). As such, each request from β costs 1.16*120 = 139.2μJ, which makes a total of 0.003 Joules for receiving and calculations. At this rate of consumption, it will take 1,706,718 rounds to deplete the battery. Suppose β sends message b 1 to LR every 1 second, it will take around 20 days to deplete the battery, with most of the energy being spent in receiving message b 1 . Hence this game cannot succeed.
VII. Conclusion
In this article we presented serverless lightweight mutual authentication protocol for small mobile resource computing devices. The protocol has been thoroughly explained, analyzed and its advantages outlined.
The originality of the protocol is based on the idea that a resource constrained device can mutually authenticate with another device without sharing any information. Our lightweight protocol uses simple primitives such as XoR, comparison and HMAC function, during mutual authentication and it also requires few storage space in each communicating party.
Thorough analysis was done to theoretically verify the security and performance properties of the protocol. The security properties have also been formally validated using AVISPA tool.
